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Abstract 
We address the problem of supporting empir­
ical probabilities in monadic logic databases. 
Though the semantics of multivalued logic 
programs has been studied extensively, the 
treatment of probabilities as results of sta­
tistical findings has not been studied in logic 
programming/deductive databases. We de­
velop a model-theoretic characterization of 
logic databases that facilitates such a treat­
ment. We present an algorithm for checking 
consistency of such databases and prove its 
total correctness. We develop a sound and 
complete query processing procedure for han­
dling queries to such databases. 
1 Introduction 
During the past decade, there has been growing in­
terest in reasoning with uncertainty in logic program­
ming, deductive databases and expert systems. The 
semantics of logic programs based on uncertainty has 
been studied by van Emden [20], Blair and Subrah­
manian [5], Dubois et al. [6], Kifer et. al. [11] and 
F itting [8]. All these studies were based upon non­
probabilistic modes of uncertainty. The first seman­
tical characterizations of probabilistic logic program­
ming were those of Ng and Subrahmanian [13, 14]. 
These characterizations were based on subjective prob­
abilities using a Kripke-style possible-worlds semantics 
along the lines of the work by Nilsson [16]. 
W hile subjective probabilities view probabilities as de­
grees of belief, empirical probabilities represent ob­
jective, statistical truths about the world/population. 
Typically, empirical probabilities are obtained from 
samples of individuals in the population. These sam­
ples can then used to inductively infer probabilities 
about the entire population. For example, if 500 monk 
seals are physically caught (in some unbiased way), 
these 500 monk seals constitute the sample in ques­
tion. Inductive reasoning allows us to draw conclusions 
about a specific monk seal that is not in the sample. 
The main aim of this paper is to capture this kind 
of empirical reasoning within the framework of deduc­
tive databases. The knowledge about specific individ­
uals in the sample is two-valued true/false knowledge. 
This knowledge is represented as a set of ordinary first 
order logic clauses called the context. The probabil­
ities derived from the sample are expressed as condi­
tional probability statements and constitute the empir­
ical component of our knowledge. These probabilities 
may then he used to induce information about objects 
not in the context (sample), but in the population. 
As we are studying only individuals and their prop­
erties, rather than the relationships between individ­
uals, these properties are represented using unary (or 
monadic) predicates. 
The first contribution of this paper is the development 
of a formal model-theoretic basis for such databases. 
This task is complicated by the fact that Herbrand in­
terpretations are not rich enough to capture the intu­
itions behind empirical probabilities (cf. Example 2). 
The second contribution is the development of sound 
and complete algorithms for determining the consis­
tency of such databases. These algorithms are based 
on constraint satisfaction techniques, and hence, may 
be implemented using standard mixed integer linear 
programming algorithms. The third contribution is a 
procedure to answer queries to such databases. This 
procedure first tries to deduce a definite answer from 
the context, and if that is not possible, it tries to in­
duce answers from the empirical component. This pro­
cedure is sound and complete. 
2 Empirical Programs 
Let C be a language generated by finitely many unary 
predicate symbols, but no function symbols. In this 
paper, we are interested in the properties of individ­
uals. Hence, we regard a predicate symbol as a rep­
resentation of a property that individuals in the do­
main of discourse may or may not have. Essentially, 
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C allows us to express properties about individuals, 
even though it does not support properties or relations 
among a group of individuals. 
Definition 1 A context C is a finite set of clauses of 
either one of the following two forms: 
i) Ko - K 1 A ... A Kn, where for all 0 � i � n, Ki is 
a ground literal, or 
ii) Lo(X) - Lt(X) A ... A Ln(X), where for all 0 � 
i � n, Li = Ai or Li = -.Ai for some predicate symbol 
Ai in C. 0 
A non-ground clause in a context is implicitly univer­
sally quantified at the front of the clause. In other 
words, the clause Lo(X) - Lt(X) A . . .  A Ln(X) 
says that for all individuals X, if X has properties 
Lt. ... , Ln, then X also has the property Lo. U n­
der this interpretation, we disallow clauses such as 
A(X)- B(Y) (for some variable symbol Y E C) and 
A(X)- B(c) (for some constant c E C) from appear­
ing in a context, as we find such clauses unintuitive for 
our purpose. An additional point worth mentioning is 
that all negations are interpreted classically. Hence, 
these are not treated in terms of the Closed World 
Assumption or other such non-monotonic rules of in­
ference. 
We now proceed to define empirical clauses. A fea­
ture of these clauses is that "complex properties" are 
embodied syntactically by the notion defined below. 
Definition 2 A complex predicate symbol F is an 
arbitrary disjunction and/or conjunction of positive 
and/or negated predicate symbols in C. 0 
As an example, if A, B and C are predicate symbols, 
then A, (AV B), ((AAB)VC) and ((-.A)AB A(-.C)) 
are some complex predicate symbols that can be gener­
ated from these three predicate symbols. Furthermore, 
given that X is a variable symbol in C, we use the no­
tations (Ft A F2)(X) and Ft(X) A F2(X) interchange­
ably, where Ft, F2 are two complex predicate symbols. 
Similarly, (Ft V F2)(X) and Ft(X) V F2(X) are the 
same. Complex predicate symbols may be viewed as 
propositional formulas with the predicate symbols of C 
being considered as propositions rather than as unary 
predicates. 
Definition 3 1) An empirical clause is of the form: 
[c1,c2) F (X) - Ft(X) A ... A Fn(X) where 
F, F1, ... , Fn are complex predicate symbols, X is a 
variable, and c1, c2 are real numbers in [0, 1] such that 
Ct � c2 and [c1, c2] is equal to neither [1,1] nor [0,0]. 
2) An empirirol program P = (C, E) consists of a con­
text C and a finite set E of empirical clauses. 0 
The intended meaning of an empirical clause is: "given 
that an arbitrary individual X has (complex) proper­
ties Ft. ... , Fn, the conditional probability of X having 
property F falls within the range [c1, c2)." From an 
empirical point of view, it states that: "amongst all 
individuals that have properties Ft, ... , Fn, between 
c1% to c2% of them have property F." Note that an 
empirical clause is not meant to include an implicit 
universal quantifier on X. In other words, it is not a 
statement about a universally quantified variable X; 
rather, it is a statement about a "generic" individual 
X in the domain of discourse. 
In classical logic, the clause A(X) - (B(X) V C(X)) 
can be represented by the two clauses: A(X)- B(X) 
and A(X)- C(X). Similarly, A(X) AB(X)- C(X) 
is equivalent to the conjunction of the clauses A( X) -
C(X) and B(X) - C(X). One may wonder whether 
such an equivalence is true for empirical clauses; if 
so, complex predicate symbols can be dispensed with. 
In [15), we show that this is not always possible, and 
thus, the presence of complex predicate symbols makes 
empirical clauses more expressive than those without 
complex symbols. 
Example 1 Consider the empirical program {C, E) 
where E consists of the following clauses: 
[0, 0.1) Grey( X) - RoyaLelephant(X) 
[0.9, 0.95) Grey( X) - Elephant(X) 
[0.1, 0.2) Elephant(X) - Grey( X) 
The first clause states that at most 10% of 
"Royal_elephants" are "Grey." The last two clauses 
describe the relative percentages of "Elephants" and 
"Grey" individuals. In particular, they state that be­
tween 90% and 95% of all "Elephants" are "Grey," 
whereas only between 10% and 20% of "Grey" indi­
viduals are "Elephants." F inally, let the context C 
consist of the following clauses: 
Elephant(X) - RoyaLelephant(X) 
Grey(X) - -.White(X) 
RoyaLelephant(clyde) -
Elephant(jill) -
The second clause states that for this particular con­
text, every individual is either "Grey" or "White." 0 
3 Model Theoretic Semantics 
3.1 Interpretations and Models 
For our language C, the notion of an interpretation is 
almost identical to the usual one for first-order lan­
guages - except for two differences. The first one is 
that interpretations I are assumed to map different 
constant symbols in C to distinct elements in the do­
main of I. The second difference is that the domain 
of I is assumed to be finite. There are two reasons 
for this assumption. The first one is that empirical 
programs are intended to reflect findings from statisti­
cal samples which are always finite. The other reason, 
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which is more technical, will be apparent in a later 
definition on satisfaction ( cf. Definition 4). 
In conventional logic programming, it suffices to use 
Her brand interpretations. However, the following ex­
ample shows that when dealing with empirical proba­
bilities, using only Herbrand interpretations and uni­
verses may not make sense at all. 
Example 2 Consider the following empirical pro­
gram: 
C: Monk...seal(joe) -
E : [0. 4, 0. 45) Female( X) - M onk_seal(X) 
The empirical clause states that between 40% and 
45% of a.ll "Monk....seals " are "Females. " The con­
text part consists only of the single fact that joe 
is a "Monk....seal. " But note that the Herbrand uni­
verse is the singleton {joe}. Since there is only 
1 member in this set, what then is the meaning 
of the statement that between 40% and 45% of all 
"Monk ...seals" are "Females"? In particular, there 
are two possible Herbrand interpretations that will 
satisfy the second clause, namely {Monk_seal(joe)} 
and {Monl:...seal(joe), Female(joe)}. In both cases, 
Female(joe) is either true or false. With only these 
two interpretations, it is unclear how they can "sat­
isfy" the first clause in an empirical sense. 0 
As the above example shows, considering Herbrand 
interpretations alone may fail to capture the empiri­
cal nature of probabilistic reasoning. Hence, in order 
to discuss arbitrary domains, we also consider non­
Herbrand interpretations. We will define shortly when 
an interpretation satisfies an empirical program. In 
the sequel , given a predicate symbol A and an inter­
pretation I with domain D, we use the notation Ar 
to denote the set {d E D I ¢A(d) = true } ,  where 
I maps the predicate symbol A to the mapping ¢A· 
We extend this notation to complex predicate sym­
bols: (F1AF2)I to mean (Fl nF21), and (Ft V F2)I to 
mean (Fl UF21), where F1, F2 are two complex predi-
cate symbols. We also use the notation IIF1A ... AFnllr 
to denote the cardinality of the set F11 n . . . n Fnr· 
Intuitively, IIF1 A ... A Fnllr denotes "the number of 
individuals in the domain of I that have properties 
Ft, ... , Fn." Before we define the notion of satisfac­
tion, recall that an empirical program consists of a 
context C and a set E of empirical clauses. Given 
the nature of C, we say that I satisfies C iff I satis­
fies every clause in C in the usual sense, for first-order 
languages. Thus, we only need to define the condition 
for I to satisfy the set E of empirical clauses. 
Definition 4 Let (C, E) be an empirical program and 
I be an interpretation. 
1) We say that I satisfies the empirical clause 
[c1, c2] F(X)- Ft(X) A ... A Fn(X) iff: 
i) IIF1A . . .  I\ Fnllr = 0, or 
ii) whenever IIF1 A ... A Fnllr > 0, c1 
< 
FIIF111 ... 1\Fa 1 < 
F1A ... AFa 1 - C2. 
2) We say that I satisfies E iff I satisfies every em­
pirical clause in E. Finally, I satisfies the empirical 
program (C, E) iff I satisfies both C and E. 0 
Example 3 Consider the empirical program in Ex­
ample 2. Let I be the interpretation defined as fol­
lows. Firstly, the domain of I is the set {dt. ... , d2o}, 
for some individuals dt, ... , d20• Secondly, I assigns to 
the constant symbol joe, the element d5. Furthemore, 
I assigns to the predicate symbol Monk...seal, the map­
ping 11 such that ft(d;) = true for all 1 :$ i :$ 10, and 
ft(d;) = false for all 11 $ i :$ 20. Finally, I assigns 
to the predicate symbol Female, the mapping /2 such 
that h(d;) = true for all 1 $ i $ 4, and ft(d;) =false 
for all 5 $ i :$ 20. Then, it is straightforward to check 
that I is a model of the program. 0 
Recall that the intuitive meaning of an empirical clause 
[c1, c2] F(X) - Ft(X) A . .. A Fn(X) is: "given that 
an arbitrary individual X has (complex) properties 
F1, ... , Fn, the conditional probability that X also has 
property F falls within the range [c1, c2)." According 
to probability theory, the statement can be represented 
. < p b(FIF ,.... ,..,. ro ) _ Prob FnF1 n ... nF. < as. cl - ro 1' '·. · ' •.rn - rob ,n ... n • -
c2, where F, F1, ... , Fn now represent the appropriate 
events and assuming that Prob(F1 n . .. n Fn) "# 0. 
Furthermore, when probabilities are interpreted em­
pirically over statistical samples, we have the follow-
ing: Prob FnF1n ... nF,. Num FnF1n ... nF. where Prob F1n ... nF,.. Num F1n ... nF. • 
Num(S) denotes the cardinality of the set S. This is 
the intuition behind Definition 4 for an interpretation 
to satisfy an empirical clause. 
Finally, recall that an interpretation I for C has a finite 
domain. A technical reason for this restriction is that 
then the ratio �;;��-·.:;;:\ 1 is always well-defined 
and is between 0 and 1, whenever IIFtA ... AFnllr > 0. 
3.2 Consistency of Empirical Programs with 
Empty Contexts 
Let {A t, ... , A1:} be the set of all predicate symbols 
in C. Furthermore, suppose that all possible sub­
sets of { A1, ... , Ai:} are enumerated in an arbitrary, 
but fixed way: 'P1, • • •  , 'P2•. For all 1 $ i :$ 2•, let 
Vi be an integer variable that intuitively denotes the 
number of individuals in an underlying domain that 
have the complex property: 1\Ae'P; A 1\At.'P; -.A. It 
is easy to see that the 'Pt's divide the set of all indi­
viduals into 2• partitions. Thus, given the v; 's, the 
number of individuals that have an arbitrary property 
F can also be determined. This amounts to check­
ing whether for all 1 $ i $ 2•, F is true in each 'P; 
- in the classical 2-valued Herbrand sense. We often 
abuse notation by regarding F as a proposition and 
write 'Pi F F whenever F is true in 'P;. Then the 
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number of individuals having property F is the sum­
mation of the number of individuals in each 1'; satis­
fying F, i.e. L'P;I=F;i=l, ... ,2• v,. Throughout this pa­
per, to simplify our notation, we often write the term 
(L'P;I=F;i=t, ... ,2• tli) as (L'P;I=F vi). 
Example 4 Consider the empirical clause 
[0.4, 0.45]Female(X) - M onk..seal(X) again. The 
two predicate symbols give rise to the following four 
partitions: 
Monk..seal Female part1t10n number 
l 1 'Pt tit 
1 0 1'2 t12 
0 1 'Pa t13 
0 0 1'4 t/4 
The first partition corresponds to individuals hav­
ing the properties "Monk..seal" and "Female," and 
so on. Now, since the property "Monk..seal" is 
true in the classical 2-valued Herbrand sense in 
1'1 E {Monk..seal, Female} and 1'2 = {Monk..seal}, 
the number of individuals having the property 
"Monk..seal" is given by (tit+ v2). 0 
Definition 5 Let E be a set of empirical clauses. 
1) Let Cl E [c1,c2] F(X) - Ft(X) A . . •  A Fn(X) 
be an empirical clause. The constraint version of Cl, 
denoted by con(Cl ), is the constraint: 
Ct * ( L tl;) $ ( E 
'P;I=F111 ... 11F,. 
E 
'P;I=F111 ... 11F,. 
v· ) < I -
2) Let con(E) denote the set {con(Cl)ICl E E} U 
2. 
u::,=l v, � 11. o 
The reason why we study con( E) is that we intend to 
check the consistency of E based on the constraints in 
con(E). More specifically, if I is a model of E, and 
if n; denotes the number of individuals in the domain 
of I corresponding to 'P; for all 1 $ i < 21:, then the 
assignment v; = n; for all 1 $ i $ 2"I represents a 
solution to the constraints in con(E). Furthermore, 
the constraint E�:l v; � 1 in con(E) guarantees that 
if I is model of E, the domain of I must be non-empty. 
While the details of this discussion will be formalized 
shortly, first consider the following example. 
Example 5 Let E consist of the single clause 
[0.4, 0.45]Female(X) - M onk...seal(X). Then ac­
cording to Example 4, con( E) consists of the following 
two constraints: 
0.4 *(tit+ t12) $ tit $ 0.45 *(tit+ t12) 
tit + v2 + va + t14 > 1 
One integer solution to this set of constraints is v1 = 
4 , t12 = 6 , va = 0 , t14 = 10. Thus, for instance, the 
interpretation considered in Example 3 satisfies these 
constraints. D 
Definition 6 Let I be an interpretation. Let Sr be 
defined as follows: for all 1 $ i $ 21:, Sr('P;) = 
II AAe'P; A 1\At'P; -.AIIr· D 
Intuitively, Sr specifies the number of individuals 
within each partition 1'; of the domain of I. 
Theorem 1 Let I be an interpretation a.nd E be a 
set of empirical clauses. I is a model of E iff Sr is a 
solution of con(E). D 
The above theorem suggests a practical way to check 
the consistency of a set E of empirical clauses. This 
amounts to checking whether con(E) bas an integer 
solution. As all the constraints are linear 1, checking 
whether con( E) has a solution can be carried out by an 
integer linear programming algorithm. One advantage 
of viewing consistency checking as constraint satisfac­
tion is that implementations of such algorithms are 
widely available, such as the LINDO package running 
on the IBM/PC. 
3.3 Consistency of Empirical Programs 
Given an empirical program {C, E), recall from Defi­
nition 4 that an interpretation I is a model of the pro­
gram iff I satisfies both C and E. Theorem 1 above 
suggests a way to check the consistency of the E part of 
the program. Moreover, there are certainly many ways 
to check the consistency of the C part, such as using 
the implementation described in [4). Obviously, the 
problem is that the consistency of C and E, when con­
sidered separately, does not guarantee the joint consis­
tency of (C, E). One straightforward solution to this 
problem is to find a model for the C part and then test 
for satisfaction of the E part using Theorem 1. How­
ever, if {C, E) is jointly inconsistent, this strategy may 
not terminate, as C may have infinitely many models. 
In the following, we present a terminating procedure 
that decides the consistency of an empirical program. 
Algorithm 1 Let the input be an empirical program 
{C,E). 
1. Partition the clauses in C into two sets C11 C2 
such that C1 consists of all non-ground clauses in 
C (i.e. Ct = {Gil Cl:: Lo(X) - Lt(X) A .. . A 
Ln(X) is a clause in C }), and C2 = C- Ct. 
2. By Definition 1, every clause in C2 is ground. 
Find all Herbrand models of C2 using techniques 
such as the one described in [4). 
1 Strictly speaking, our constraints are fractional con­
straints. However, for most applications, these fractional 
constraints can be easily translated to linear constraints. 
See (19] for a. general treatment on a. translation from frac­
tional to linear constraints. 
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3. If no such Herbrand model can be found, declare 
that the program is inconsistent and halt. 
4. Otherwise, let { M1, ... , Mu} be the set of Her­
brand models of C2 computed in Step 2. Set i to 
1. 
5. If j > u, declare that the empirical program is 
inconsistent and halt. 
6. Initialize the set T to con(E). 
7. For each clause Cl = Lo(X) +- Lt(X) A 
. . . A Ln(X) in C1, add the constraint: 
c�::::.,,I=Lo/\Ll/\ ... 1\L. Vi = L1';I=Lli\ ... I\L. Vi) to 
T. 
8. For each predicate symbol A appearing in C2, do 
the following: 
• Compute the number nA which is the cardi­
nality of the set {A( c) I A( c) E Mj for some 
constant symbol c}. Then add the constraint: 
(L'P;I=A Vi ?: nA) to T. 
• Similarly, compute the number iiA which is 
the cardinality of the set {-.A( c) I A( c) ¢ Mj 
for some constant symbol c}. Then add the 
constraint: (Lp,j;;;-.A Vi ?: iiA) to T. 
9. Determine whether the constraints in T have a 
solution. If they do, declare that the program is 
consistent and halt. 
10. Otherwise, increment j and go to Step 5. 0 
In Step 1 of Algorithm 1, the context C is partitioned 
into two sets: C 1  consisting of all non-ground clauses 
and C2 consisting of all ground clauses in C. As the 
number of clauses in c2 is finite and all clauses are 
ground, the computation in Step 2 always terminates 
with a finite set ofHerbrand models If this set is empty, 
then {C, E) is inconsistent. Otherwise, for each Her­
brand model Mj computed, Step 8 adds constraints of 
the forms (LP;I=A Vi ?: nA) and (E,,I=...,A Vi ?: iiA) 
to T for each predicate symbol A. This is to guar­
antee that subsequently an interpretation that corre­
sponds to a solution of the constraints in T, will be 
able to make all ground atoms A( c) true iff A( c) E Mj. 
F inally, for Step 9, any standard mixed integer lin­
ear programming algorithm can be used to determine 
whether the constraints in T have a solution. This step 
is also guaranteed to halt. Hence, Algorithm 1 always 
terminates. 
Theorem 2 Algorithm 1 is sound and complete in 
determining consistency of empirical programs, i.e. 
(C, E) is consistent iff Algorithm 1 declares that it is 
consistent. 0 
Example 6 Consider the empirical program: 
C: Monk....11eal(joe) +-
-.F emale(joe) +-
E : [0.4, 0.45] Female( X) +- M onk....11eal(X) 
The following constraints are tested for satisfiability 
by Algorithm 1: 
t12 + V4 ;?: 
0.4 * (vi + t12) :$ 
1 
1 
(1) 
(2) 
VJ :$ 0.45 * (vl + t12) (3) 
VJ + V2 + V3 + V4 > 1 ( 4) 
It is easy to verify that these constraints are satisfiable. 
For instance, one solution is: v1 = 4, v2 = 6 and vs, t14 
equal to any non-negative integers. Thus, this program 
is consistent; for instance, the intepretation given in 
Example 3 is a model. 0 
The above example highlights the major difference be­
tween the current framework for empirical probabili­
ties and the earlier formalisms we proposed for subjec­
tive probabilities [13, 14]. In those formalisms, a clause 
corresponding in appearance to an emprical clause 
applies to every individual in the Herbrand domain. 
Thus, the subjective probability of Female(joe) is si­
multaneously 0 due to -.F emale(ioe), and between 0.4 
and 0.45 due to the clause in E. This gives rise to an 
inconsistency. Thus, this program is inconsistent in 
the formalisms in [13, 14] . 
4 Query Processing for Consistent 
Empirical Programs 
4.1 Outline for Query Answering 
A query to an empirical program is of the form: 
Q = F(d) which intuitively <\Sks for the conditional 
probability of constant d having (complex) property F ,  
given that the program is true. As a preview, we first 
outline below a two-step procedure that can be used 
to answer this query; the procedure will be formalized 
in Section 4.3. 
In the first step, the query answering procedure poses 
the query against the context C. If the context can 
deduce the truth or falsity of the query, then the pro­
cedure returns the answer 1 or 0 respectively, and the 
processing for the query is completed. Otherwise, the 
procedure moves to the second stage. 
When no definite answer to the query can be de­
duced, the procedure then tries to induce the condi­
tional probability by consulting the empirical clauses 
in E. More specifically, given the properties possessed 
by d, the procedure poses the query F(X) to the em­
pirical clauses. As we argued before, the X here should 
not be taken as a quantifier; rather, it represents a 
generic random individual in the domain. 
Example 7 Consider the program discussed in Ex­
ample 1. Suppose the query is Qt = Elephant(clyde). 
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Then, using the first and third clauses, it is easy to 
see that, given the context, the conditional probabil­
ity of Elephant(clyde) is 1. Now consider the query 
Q2 :::; Grey(clyde). No definite answer for Q2 can be 
deduced from the context. Thus, the query Grey(X) 
is posed to the empirical clauses. The first two empir­
ical clauses may be used to induce information about 
clyde because clyde is known, from the context, to be 
both an "Elephant" and a "RoyaLelephant." 0 
The query Q2 in the above example underlines a ma­
jor issue involved in such inductive answering - the 
choice of answers when more than one inductive an­
swer is possible. The approach we take to resolve such 
conflicts is the one customarily used in statistical in­
ferences - choose the one with the most specific refer­
ence class. In the following, before we formalize our 
query answering procedure, we first discuss how empir­
ical programs can be compiled to facilitate the choice 
of reference classes and the corresponding empirical 
clauses. 
4.2 Unfolding and Chaining of Empirical 
Programs 
The unfolding procedure below computes the set of 
implications that are needed in query answering to de­
termine the preferences of clauses. 
Algorithm 2 Let C be the context of an empirical 
program. 
1. Set S to be the set of all complex predicate sym­
bols in C. Set C' to be the set of all non­
ground clauses in C, i.e. C' = {Lo - Lt 1\ . . . I\ 
Ln I Lo(X)- Lt(X) 1\ . . . I\ Ln(X) is a clause in 
C}. 
2. Construct 
impl(C) = {Ft (X) - F2(X) I F1. F2 E S and 
{ ....,(Ft V ....,F2)} U C' is unsatisfiable }. 0 
Recall that there are only finitely many predicate sym­
bols in C. Thus, in [15], we show that the set S de­
scribed in Algorithm 2 must be finite. Hence, the algo­
rithm always terminates, yielding a finite set impl(C). 
Algorithm 2 is not the only optimization that can be 
carried out in compiling a program. Another one is 
chaining that can be computed by the following algo­
rithm. The purpose of chaining clauses is to ensure 
that our query answering procedure ( cf. Algorithm 4 
below) is complete (cf. Theorem 4). In the sequel, the 
symbols F1. F2, F3 and F4 are assumed to be distinct 
complex predicate symbols. 
Algorithm 3 Let EP = (C, E) be an empirical pro­
gram. 
1. Use Algorithm 2 to compute the set impl(C). 
2. Set To to E, and i to 1. 
3. Construct the set St = { [ei.l] Ft(X) - F3(X) I 
Ft (X) - F2(X) is a clause in impl(C) and 
[ct, e2] F2(X) - F3(X) is a clause in Ta-t }· 
4. Construct the set s2 = { [1- c2, 1- Ct] Ft (X)­
F2(X) I [c1. c2] ....,Ft(X) - F2(X) is a clause in 
11-d· 
5. Construct the set s3 = { [maz{O, CJ + dt -
1},min{c2,d2}] (Ft/\F2)(X)- F3(X) I Ft :/: F2 
and [ct ,e2] Ft(X)- F3(X) and [dt,d2] F2(X)­
F3(X) are clauses in 7i-d· 
6. Construct the set S4 = 
{ [maz{ct, dt }, min{1, c2 + d2}] (Ft V F2)(X) -
Fa(X) I Ft # F2 and [ct .e2] Ft (X) - Fa(X) 
and [dt , d2] F2(X) - F3(X) are clauses in 11-d· 
7. Construct the set Ss = { [O,min{1,c2+d2}] (Ft/\ 
Fa)(X) - F2(X) V F4(X) I Ft # F4, F2 # 
F4, F2 # F3 and [ct, c2] Ft (X) - F2(X) and 
(dt,d2] F3(X)- F4(X) are clauses in T&-1}. 
8. Set 1i = Ta-t USt US2US3US4US5. 1£11 is the 
same as 11-t, then set comp(EP) ={imp/( C), 11) 
and halt. 
9. Otherwise, increment i and go to Step 3. 0 
Note that it is possible to have clauses of the form 
Ft(X) - F2(X) and F2(X) - Ft(X) in impl(C) 
simultaneously. It is also possible to have empirical 
clauses [ct. c2] F1(X) - F2(X) and (d11 d2] F2(X) -
F1(X) in E. Checking 11 = 1i-1 in Step 8 of Algo­
rithm 3 is to prohibit cyclic chaining of clauses. In 
other words, the algorithm continues to the next it­
eration only if at least one new empirical clause is 
added in the current iteration. Since the number of 
predicate symbols in C is finite, there can only be a 
finite number of empirical clauses of the forms gen­
erated above. Thus, the above algorithm terminates 
after a finite number of iterations, yielding a finite pro­
gram eomp(EP). Theorem 3 below shows that chain­
ing does not change the meaning of an empirical pro­
gram. 
Theorem 3 Let EP = {C, E) be an empirical pro­
gram. Then EP and comp(EP) are logically equiva­
lent. 0 
4.3 A Procedure for Query Answering 
Recall from Section 4.1 that inductive answering in­
volves choosing the most specific reference class. How­
ever, in general, as reference classes may only follow a 
partial order in specificity, there may not be a unique 
most specific reference class; rather, there may only 
be several maximally specific reference classes. The 
following definition deals with this situation. 
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Definition 7 Let C be a context and impl(C) be 
computed as shown above. FUrthermore, let S be a set 
of complex predicate symbols {Ft, ... , F,.}. A subset 
T of S is a maximally preferred cluster in S based on 
impl(C) if: 
i) for any two elements F;, Fj E T,  F;(X) +- Fj(X) E 
impl( C) and vice versa, for some variable symbol X, 
and 
ii) for all Fj E (S- T), Fi(X) +- F;(X) fl. impl(C), 
where Fi E T. 0 
Basically, if two formulas F,, Fi are in the same clus-­
ter, then the context C entails the formula F;(X) +-+ 
Fj(X) , i.e. as far as the context C is concerned, the 
formulas Fi and F; a.re essentially equivalent. Intu­
itively, a maximally preferred cluster corresponds to a 
maximally specific reference class. This is formalized 
by Condition (ii) of the definition above. 
Algorithm 4 Let the inputs be a query F(d) and the 
compiled version comp(EP) = (C , E) of a.n empirica.l 
program. 
1. If F(d) is a logical consequence of C, return 1 as 
the probability, and halt. 
2. If -.F(d) is a logical consequence of C, return 0 as 
the probability, and halt. 
3. (Inductive answering begins.) Otherwise, con­
struct the setS= { [c1tc2]F(X) +- Ft(X) E E I 
Ft (d) is a logical consequence of C} U { Cll Cl =: 
[ct.c2]F(X) +- E E}. Intuitively, S contains all 
the applicable empirical clauses that either have 
a null body or require properties possessed by the 
individual d. If S is empty, halt. 
4. Otherwise, construct the set 
St = { Ft I [c1.c2]F(X) +- Ft(X) E S}. (For 
clauses in S that have a null body, true is added 
to St.) 
5. Compute the set of maximally preferred clus­
ters in S1 based on impl(C). Let this set be 
{Tt, .. . , Tm } · 
6. For each Tt, 1 ::; i::; m, do the following. Let Tt == 
{Ft, ... , Fu} for some Ft, ... , Fu. Return the 
range n� =1 [c{, �] as the probability range based 
� . . 
on Ft, ... , Fu, where the clauses [cL �] F(X) -
F;(X) for all 1 $ j $ u are all in S. 0 
Note that Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Algorithm 4 involve 
checking to see whether a ground atom of the form 
F(d) is true or false in all the models of the given 
context C. Such testing can be implemented by a 
standard unsatisfiability checker, such as one based 
on resolution, or a mixed integer linear programming 
algorithm such as the one in [4]. 
Example 8 Suppose the query -.White(clyde) is 
posed against the program considered in Example 1. 
It is easy to see that there a.re models of the context 
C in which -.White(clyde) is true as well as models 
of C in which -.White(clyde) is false. Thus, induc­
tive answering in Step 3 of Algorithm 4 is needed. 
Since it is obvious that both Royal_elephant(clyde) 
and Elephant( clyde) are true in all models of C, the 
two clauses below (which are generated when the pro­
gram is compiled by Algorithm 3) are added to the set 
S in Step 3: 
{0, 0.1] ..,White( X) +- RoyaLelephant(X) 
[0, 0.95] ..,White( X) +- Elephant( X) 
The set St constructed in Step 4 of Algorithm 4 
is {Elephant, RoyaLelephant}. Since the clause 
Elephant( X) +- Royal_elephant(X) is inC, it is obvi­
ous that there is only one maximally preferred cluster 
-namely the singleton set {RoyaLelephant}. Hence, 
the answer of the query is the range [0,0.1], and the 
range {0,0.95] based on Elephant is not returned as an 
answer. 0 
Given a compiled empirical program comp(EP) and 
a query F(d), we use the notation proof(EP, F, d) to 
denote the set of all ranges 2 obtained by applying 
Algorithm 4 to comp(EP) and F(d). We also use the 
notation consq( E P, F, d) to denote the set of all ranges 
satisfied by all the models of EP for the query F(d). 
Theorem 4 Let EP = {C, E) be an empirical pro­
gram and F(d) be a query. Then Algorithm 4 is sound 
and complete ,  i.e. proof(EP, F, d)= consq(EP, F, d). 
0 
5 Related Work 
Our framework was inspired, in part, by Bacchus' 
framework that extends full first order logic with em­
pirical probability statements. He develops a sound 
and complete proof procedure for consistent theo­
ries, but does not provide a consistency check mecha­
nism. We provide explicit mechanisms for determining 
the consistency of empirical programs. These mecha­
nisms are based upon mixed integer linear program­
ming techniques and hence, may be implemented on 
top of standard integer programming packages. They 
are guaranteed to terminate. Both Bacchus [2] and 
our framework use the concept of inductive answering. 
FUrthermore, we provide compilation techniques that 
facilitate processing of queries that require inductive 
(and deductive) answering. 
The integration of logic and probability theory bas 
been the subject of numerous studies [7, 10, 16, 18]. 
Fagin, Halpern and Meggido [7] have proposed a 
lThe probabilities 1 and 0 can be represented by the 
ranges [1,1) and [0,0) respectively. 
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model-theoretic basis for reasoning about systems of 
linear inequalities of probabilities. Their proposal is 
based on the possible-world approach, and hence is 
different from the empirical approach considered here. 
Kavvadias and Papadimitriou [10] have studied the 
consistency of probabilistic logic programs using lin­
ear programming. However, their study is based on 
Nilsson's possible worlds semantics, i.e. the linear pro­
grams specify constraints on the probability distribu­
tions over the set of possible worlds (which is identical 
to the set of Herbrand interpretations). On the other 
hand, the linear programs in our framework specify 
constraints over the domain of an interpretation, which 
may or may not be an Herbrand interpretation. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we develop a model-theoretic foundation 
for logic programming that supports empirical proba­
bilities and allows inductive probabilistic reasoning to 
be performed. To capture the intuitions behind empir­
ical probabilities, our model theory also considers non­
Herbrand interpretations. Furthermore, we develop a 
totally correct algorithm for verifying the consistency 
of monadic deductive databases. This algorithm can 
be implemented using mixed integer linear program­
ming algorithms. F inally, for dealing with queries to 
such databases, we develop a sound and complete pro­
cedure that uses deductive and inductive answering. 
We also devise compilation techniques to facilitate this 
procedure. 
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